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Kantorowicz’s Oaths 
A Californian Moment in the History of Academic Freedom*
Abstract: This essay is about Ernst Kantorowicz’s stance on the anti-commu-
nist Loyalty Oath controversy at the University of California in the early years 
of the Cold War. Kantorowicz, who just had escaped Nazi Germany, found 
himself caught up in a fight between a group of so-called non-signers and the 
Regents of the University who tried to enforce a political oath on all faculty. 
In his pamphlet about the controversy Kantorowicz turned this moment of 
university politics into a meditation on the “fundamental issues” of academic 
freedom, the very character of the public office of the university professor, 
and the character of the university as legal corporation, which resembled his 
notion of a Secret Germany and anticipated aspects of his The King’s Two Bod-
ies. After a close-reading of Kantorowicz’ pamphlet in which I analyze his 
understanding of the university as an idealized Arcadia of scholarship and 
a mythistorical reiteration of the medieval universitas magistrorum et scho-
larium, I finally turn to the afterlife of the Loyalty Oath controversy and its 
implications for our understanding of academic freedom. 
Key Words: Historiography; Cold War intellectual History; History of Uni-
versities; Ernst Kantorowicz; Edward Tolman; California Loyalty Oath; Aca-
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“One day I found in my mail an offprint from a liturgical periodical published by 
a Benedictine Abbey in the United States, which bore the publisher’s imprint: The 
Order of St. Benedict, Inc.” Ernst Kantorowicz was more than surprised when he 
learned from his Berkeley colleague, the classicist and legal scholar Max Radin1, that 
monastic congregations were legally incorporated in the United States. Their con-
versation took them to questions about the “curious legal fiction” of the King’s Two 
Bodies, a problem previously only discussed in Frederick Maitland’s famous study.2 
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When Kantorowicz was asked to contribute to a festschrift for Radin, he decided to 
write a chapter on this issue. Though the volume never materialized, Kantorowicz 
published the paper elsewhere and dedicated it to his friend who had meanwhile 
become a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Yet Radin died 
in June 1950, shortly after the end of the “Year of the Oath” at Berkeley. “Personal 
affairs such as the exasperating struggle against the Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia as well as other duties prevented me from laying my gift into the hands of my 
friend,”3 Kantorowicz wrote. Despite what he suggests in this anecdote, I argue here 
that this issue had also “fundamentally” preoccupied him in writing his pamphlet 
against the so-called Loyalty Oath.
This article concerns this extended moment in the long history of academic free-
dom: the months during which Kantorowicz both contemplated the problem of the 
two bodies and engaged in a controversy that he considered fundamental rather 
than simply an issue of university politics. Kantorowicz, “a scholar coming from the 
European continent and not trained in the refinements of Anglo-American legal 
thinking,”4 was baffled to learn that not only venerable communities like the Bene-
dictines but also universities were considered legal corporations – like commercial 
businesses. It was one of many lessons in American academic culture that he had to 
learn. The insight, however, deepened his resistance to the existence of the univer-
sity as a mundane corporation. It led Kantorowicz to profess the fundamentals of 
the European university that the Nazis had forced him to leave behind. Yet, having 
arrived at Berkeley, Kantorowicz became involved in a personal fight with the 
Regents of the University of California centered not only on the anonymity of the 
rational authority of the American academic system but also the Regents’ attempt to 
introduce capitalist momentum into the bureaucratic machinery.5 
Thus the Loyalty Oath first materialized as a matter of paperwork, as standard-
ized letters sent out to all instructors on the Berkeley campus. Kantorowicz was just 
one of many faculty. Nothing seemed particularly offensive at first glance. Only 
with a closer look did it turn out to be yet another onslaught in the early history of 
the new public management of academic institutions. It was a bureaucratic act, an 
emerging form of management that implied and imposed different university pol-
itics. This shift was partly what drove Kantorowicz to refuse to take the Oath. In 
his book on paperwork Ben Kafka reminds us of IBM’s vision of bureaucracy. The 
slogan launched by Industrial Business Machines in their 1967 film The Explosion 
of Paperwork – “machines should work, people should think” – demonstrates the 
wishful thinking involved in this vision of a flawless bureaucratic apparatus poised 
to co-opt the autonomous self-governance of the university as corporation in a tra-
ditional sense. Indeed the bureaucratic machinery made Kantorowicz and his col-
leagues think: Other than the different bodies of academic self-governance, the 
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Regents were trustees of a bureaucratic apparatus that had become the institutional 
organization to manage California’s public university. With the implementation of 
the Regents’ decision to require an additional oath, all Berkeley faculty received a 
reappointment letter. The message came out of the blue. As Hannah Arendt put it, 
though certainly in different context, in government by bureaucracy “decrees appear 
in their naked purity as though they were no longer issued by powerful men, but 
were the incarnation of power itself and the administrator only its accidental agent.”6 
Yet from the perspective of Kantorowicz and others the anonymity of these letters 
appeared as a provocation against the ways they related to the university. This was in 
fact a threat to the symbolic office the institution was supposed to guarantee: 
“My dear Professor X:
 This is to notify you that you have been appointed Professor of 
……………………… 
for the period July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950 
with salary at the rate of $ ………………………….
Salary is subject to such deductions as may be required under the Retiring 
Annuities System or the State Employees’ Retirement Act, and State and 
Federal tax deductions. 
 It will be necessary for you to sign and return the enclosed letter of accep-
tance of the position and salary in the form prescribed by the Regents on 
April 21, 1950; and subscribe and swear to the enclosed oath before a notary 
public.
   Yours very truly,
      George D. Mallory 
      Assistant Secretary”
Many professors just signed and returned the letter without further ado–the nota-
rized sworn oath enclosed. But it was to this very letter that many members of the 
faculty reacted with strong opposition, though not all of them were as articulate 
as Kantorowicz. But the letter made them think about their status, their privileges, 
and academic freedom more generally. This concern would spread and affect aca-
demics across the whole country.7 It may be unsurprising that many of those who 
raised public concern were part of departments where research had not yet taken 
on the form of industrial or military funded Big Science that unavoidably entailed 
bureaucracy avant la lettre. There is strong evidence that opposition against the Oath 
was mostly articulated by faculty in the humanities and social sciences.8 This has, 
roughly speaking, two reasons: First, their fields of study often had political implica-
tions. Second, research in the sciences and engineering often involved the manage-
ment of large infrastructure and considerable funds. Some of the most capable sci-
entists on campus, an eye-witness recalled, “took the position […] that the Commu-
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nist Party is a criminal conspiracy, no member of it has the objectivity and freedom 
of intellect required of a teacher and shouldn’t be in a university, and the rest of us 
had better swear that we’re not, so that if any refused to do this, it’s right that they 
be fired.”9 These circumstances made opposition to public management by trustees 
and bureaucratic administration more difficult since it was often a prerequisite to 
running labs and doing Big Science.10 Contrary to the recent critique of new pub-
lic management, “the modern university has long been engaged in industrial and 
governmental research that coexists uneasily with the university’s erstwhile mission 
of open discourse.”11 Indubitably, the university had once been created as a space to 
think without consequences. 
The University of California Loyalty Oath controversy was certainly not a trans-
formative moment in History12, as Hegel had it, but rather a historical moment that 
allowed for further observations. It falls into two parts: On the one hand, there was a 
structural conflict between applied research, the institutional environment it creates, 
and freedom of teaching and learning based on academic inquiry free of restraints 
surfaced at a moment when the politics of the administration collided with the prin-
ciples of academic self-governance. These aspects of the controversy have been ana-
lyzed and historized in detail. Scholarship on Kantorowicz’s work and life mostly 
agrees that his engagement in the Loyalty Oath controversy was a moment of con-
version from a conservative (who did not refrain from flirting with the Nazi ide-
ology) to a good liberal academic citizen of the United States. This view is as true 
as it is wrong, given the all-too-optimistic teleology of the narrative that frames it. 
On the other hand, what remains an open question is how the claim for academic 
freedom, relative autonomy, and de-facto sovereignty within the academic territory 
can be justified. Kantorowicz’s pamphlet The Fundamental Issue was an attempt at 
a spontaneous history and philosophy of academic freedom within this particular 
context. Kantorowicz’s thoughts about the Oath are somehow an Einfall ins Denken 
about and along the lines of academic freedom and its traditions. I shall thus focus 
on how he legitimizes what cannot be legitimized but only unconditionally claimed. 
The limits of academic freedom begin where it interferes with other autonomous 
social spaces since all forms of freedom “are socially engineered spaces in which 
parties engaged in specified pursuits enjoy protection from parties who would oth-
erwise naturally seek to interfere in those pursuits.”13 Academic freedom was and 
remains vulnerable. For this very reason democratic governments tend to legally 
protect these forms of relative autonomy. 
Kantorowicz’s argument, as I will show, comprises two parts: First, his reflec-
tions on the Loyalty Oath controversy have a remarkable temporal structure that 
combines historical and mythical elements at least as far as its fundamental issues 
are concerned. Second, the controversy was not primarily a debate about the rel-
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ative autonomy of the scientific but a negotiation over the autonomy of the aca-
demic field, in other words, the constitution and foundations of academia as a cor-
poration of learning. Kantorowicz did not really distinguish between the univer-
sity as “real-world” institution and its mythistorical doppelganger. What appeared 
to be a fundamental issue in Kantorowicz’s understanding turns out to be an issue 
of the imaginary of the institution and the particular temporal structure of the aca-
demic territory. While most of his colleagues in almost any discipline or “academic 
tribe” were concerned with their existence as local “lords” and “chieftains” (depend-
ing on respective sub-cultures),14 Kantorowicz’s community inhabited an Arcadian 
landscape rather than the groves of Academe. His “defiance,” observed Martin Jay, 
“reflected an exalted image of the university as a community – indeed, a kind of 
sacred body or clerisy.”15 It is true that Kantorowicz’s “strange mixture of vast eru-
dition and scrupulous scholarship, on the one hand, and obsessive yearning for a 
redemptive community he could call his own, on the other, produced no real heirs 
in the narrow sense of a school.”16 But did it not, in fact, create – what Jay called – a 
“mythological tradition” within a utopian space of an historical ideal defined by its 
mythistory? Arguably, it was never his intention to build a school, since he believed 
himself to be part of a community of scholars that constituted itself beyond the rav-
ages of time, thus he was not interested in academic reproduction.
Kantorowicz’s faith in an academic community spanning the “time of scholar-
ship,”17 an eternal co-presence of genius minds, followed the model of a “Secret Ger-
many” (Geheimes Deutschland), an idealized constellation of synchronic heroic his-
torical figures, a nation without a territory, a global tribe of scholarship and learning. 
Their genealogy is not to be understood as worldly history but as a mythic history of 
gods. Keeping Alain Boureau’s observation in mind that Kantorowicz was “a patriot 
without a country,”18 I want to suggest that in his pamphlet on the Loyalty Oath he 
argued for an imaginary space defined by “mythistorical”19 ideals of academia rather 
than for an institutional space of academic territory. The Arcadia of scholarship was 
about to become Kantorowicz’s new home. Nevertheless, this mythistory masks a 
conflict between the university as a mundane institution and its ideal as an Arca-
dia of scholarship. An Academic Arcadia, of course, can only exist as an idealized 
place, a mythopoetic territory. Mythistory is to be understood as some sort of liga-
ture between history and myth by insisting that one can observe the “persistence of 
myth in history”20 as well as in historiography. While this notion acknowledges the 
difference between the two concepts, it emphasizes its interconnectedness on differ-
ent levels. Thus in his book on mythistory Joseph Mali proposed to recognize “myth 
for what it is: a story that has passed into and become history. The critical task of this 
historiography, or mythistory, is to reappraise these stories as inevitable, and ulti-
mately valuable, histories of personal and communal identity.”21 In the case at hand, 
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Kantorowicz was not actually interested in the history of institutions but used fiction 
and myth as starting points for a theoretical analysis based on the assumption that 
political institutions are grounded on mythical and poetic figures that constitute a 
third sphere of symbolic exchange. He would read texts isolated from their histori-
cal contexts by pointing to how they speak to each other beyond the limitations of 
chronology in a universe of great minds. The French legal theorist Pierre Legendre 
has argued that a chronological reading of Kantorowicz and the texts he cites does 
not allow for an appropriate understanding of his work. Kantorowicz, he claimed, 
even aimed at an anthropological level of analysis, for instance when thinking about 
notions like humanitas or arcana imperii which he used as universal trajectories for 
a history of humankind. I will return to this point later on. Before we engage with 
Kantorowicz’s vision of 20th century California as a permutation of the myth of the 
medieval university, I shall give a brief account of the events of the long “Year of the 
Oath.”22
1. Brief Account of the Loyalty Oath Controversy
So many versions of this story exist in oral23 and written24 form that it hardly makes 
sense to add yet another. But as a way of giving some historical background for the 
reader I cannot but give a very brief account of what happened during the Year of the 
Oath. Here is the Cold War pre-history of the heated controversy that would later 
throw a long shadow over all of the University of California’s campuses.25 
In early 1949 Republican California State senator Jack Tenney introduced thir-
teen bills to hunt down communists in government and administration. As chair of 
California’s committee on “un-American activities” he made a reputation as a foe 
of communism through a combination of merciless politics and infamous polemic. 
His politics motivated the administration of California’s public universities to imple-
ment an equivalent to the loyalty oaths that he had helped to introduce to the State’s 
legislation. There is strong evidence that he tried to prevent legislative extortion by 
the Californian government by making sure that the faculty was lily-white and free 
of communism. Though as with any other form of propaganda there must always be 
someone in the anonymous audience willing to listen. 
In the United States the tradition of loyalty oaths dates back to the American 
Civil War, when political prisoners could be released upon taking an “oath of alle-
giance.” Lincoln offered Presidential pardon to those who would “faithfully support, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” During World War II loy-
alty oaths were common, even school children marched in support of Roosevelt’s 
National Recovery Administration: “I will buy only where the Blue Eagle flies.” In 
122 ÖZG 25 | 2014 | 3
the aftermath of the war, a politically instrumentalized “fear” of the “Red” haunted 
the country. Already in the 1930s, anticommunism had become a “mainstream con-
cern” based on an ideology that the communist party was “not a regular political 
party, but rather a conspiracy.”26 With the rise of Joseph McCarthy, the “Red Scare” 
became viral. In March 1947 President Truman instituted his anti-communist “Doc-
trine” that included loyalty oaths from every individual suspected of membership in 
a so-called anti-democratic organization, ultimately aiming at the communist party. 
The eradication of communism had become an official political ideology. 
At the University of California, the Regents had already established an anti-com-
munist policy in 1940.27 Even though the Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure of the American Association of University Professors considered affiliations 
with the Communist Party not to be a breach of professional standards as long as the 
party was legal in the United States, the Regents continued to exclude communists 
and communist sympathizers from the faculty.28 What was new about this new wave 
of “zealotry” in American higher education was that university administrations 
where no longer hunting individual dissenters but aiming at an entire group of aca-
demics associated with the communist party and their radical political activities.29 
The Soviet Union’s detonation of its first atomic bomb in early 1949 triggered a series 
of investigations against potential communist spies in the United States, which, in 
turn, escalated public paranoia and sweeping accusations against American com-
munists. Since Berkeley’s physicist Robert Oppenheimer directed the civilian side of 
the Manhattan Project, the investigations included the University of California and 
thereby raised concerns among its administrators.30 The situation at the University 
of California was not unique: “During the Cold War, institutions of higher learning 
typically sacrificed faculty in the face of political pressure.”31 
Against this background it was hardly surprising that administrators grew con-
cerned when the British economist and Labour Party activist Harold Laski was 
invited to talk at the Los Angeles campus in the spring of 1949. Students had also 
asked for a debate between Laski and Herbert Phillips on whether communists could 
act as free and impartial scholars. Phillips was a member of the American commu-
nist party and had just been fired by the University of Washington. This was a deli-
cate decision to make considering the University of California’s policy prohibiting 
political activities on the campuses. The debate was granted under the condition that 
only graduate students could attend the debate, which inevitably led to protests by 
undergraduates. An invitation of Laski to Berkeley was turned down by president 
Sproul who was concerned about the bad publicity of such an event and the possi-
ble reaction by the Regents. 
For the majority of university professors, the thought of communists entering 
the system of public education threatened the very idea of a free America. “The 
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Communist party, U.S.A., was adjudged by many to be a fifth column within the 
body politic, and as a people in fear is no more discerning than a people in anger, 
the nation lashed out to secure domestically what seemingly eluded it internation-
ally. […] America was disquieted and the uneasiness of the times could not help but 
penetrate the consciousness of the trustees of California’s state university.”32 In fact 
the University of California was of course at no point in danger of being taken over 
by lefties – not even ten years later during the heyday of the Free Speech Movement 
or, even later, when prominent radical European academics like Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, or Étienne Balibar were regular visitors on the University’s cam-
puses. The majority of the faculty always seemed to be pragmatic progressive liber-
als rather than political radicals. Bob Blauner characterized Berkeley at the time of 
the Oath as, in fact, a “conservative institution, despite its façade of enlightened lib-
eralism.”33 On the other hand, as William Dennes has claimed, a large part of the 
faculty tended to say, “Those of us who aren’t Communists, we ought to be proud 
to swear.”34 To give just one of the many examples of the attitude of those who sym-
pathized with the opposition against the Oath I cite Kantorowicz’s colleague in the 
history department, the Americanist John D. Hicks: “You remember, I trust, that I 
was one of the first to sign the Anti-Communist oath, and that my only objection, 
[…] was the way in which, by requiring annual repetitions, it completely vitiates any 
legal claim to tenure rights on the part of the faculty. My interest in this case stems 
in no way from sympathy with Communists or Communism. No one on this faculty 
or on the Board of Regents, has fought these wreckers any harder than I have. If any 
member of the thirty-nine non-signers were tainted with Communism, I would be 
against him. But the integrity of these men has been abundantly proved. The matter 
before us has nothing to do with Communism. The question is merely one of good 
faith. Will the Regents keep their implied pledge, or will they flout it?”35 
The structurally paranoid Cold War discourse about the dangers of communism 
introduced a new form of politics to the academic territory. What used to be a rela-
tively autonomous political sphere of academic self-governance was questioned by a 
new policy of hyperbolic “loyalty” to the State. Since 1942 every faculty member had 
already been sworn into a constitutional oath of allegiance when they were invested 
with a public office: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will 
support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of 
California, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of my office according to 
the best of my ability.”36 
In early 1950 the majority of the members of the Academic Senate at the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles voted in favor of removing com-
munists from their positions. Unsurprisingly, administrators at Berkeley and other 
campuses had been discussing the university’s standpoint towards communism. The 
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Regents were increasingly “concerned” with communists and communist sympa-
thizers within the university. One of several options was to introduce an anti-com-
munist oath for the faculty. President Sproul proposed that all faculty had to, in 
addition to the existing constitutional oath, swear a new anti-communist oath. The 
fact that all employees of the university were supposed to swear this oath seems to 
never have been considered problematic. These discussions and the following deci-
sion happened in chambers and did not involve faculty in any way. During their 
March meeting, the Board of Regents approved Sproul’s proposal, and thus intro-
duced the new policy. In doing so, they questioned the principles of academic integ-
rity, i.e. an ethics of Truths, and replaced it with a normative moralo-political dis-
course of subjugation to the Regents of the University. Every faculty member would 
have to sign the Oath, as finally passed by the Regents March 25, 1949.
The policy first became public in early 1949 in a short note in Berkeley’s Faculty 
Bulletin. The Secretary of the Regents wrote: 
The Regents of the University have directed me to include in acceptance let-
ters when 1949–50 appointments are made an oath of allegiance in the form 
to be set forth therein, and that all faculty and employees must take the oath 
as part of the acceptance. This procedure is about to go into effect for new 
appointees for the remainder of this fiscal year, but persons taking the oath 
of allegiance now will not be required to do so again on next annual appoint-
ments. Salary checks cannot be released until acceptance letters have been 
returned to this office properly signed before a Notary Public.37
This note raised concerns among faculty members on all the University of Califor-
nia campuses, even though there was a broad, almost unanimous, consent that there 
should be no communists on the faculty. Many were concerned about their privile-
ges of tenure and academic freedom. In this way the institution that had performed 
the academic ritual of the faculty’s investiture to symbolic office was now threate-
ning its members with the possibility of revoking tenure. At this time, a university 
professor could assume certain privileges that guaranteed relative autonomy of aca-
demic freedom and the usucaptional right to tenure. Therefore it came as a surprise 
when every instructor at Berkeley and other campuses of the University of Cali-
fornia should receive a new contract that would not only, though implicitly, deny 
the right for tenure by granting the salary only on a year-to-year renewable basis 
but also required all of them to take an oath denying their membership or belief in 
organizations advocating the overthrow of the United States government  – obvi-
ously aiming at the exclusion of communists from the faculty. This overall situa-
tion became public with an unusual publication by Berkeley’s professor of English, 
George Stewart, who had assembled materials in order to document the atmosphere 
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during the year of the Oath at Berkeley.38 The book was a first, strong sign of sympa-
thy and solidarity with those who would resist the new Oath.
In June of the same year the Northern Section of the Academic Senate met in 
Berkeley and, after a heated debate, decided to request the revision or removal of 
the Oath. Already at the Senate meeting of June 14, Kantorowicz, among others, first 
articulated some of the concerns that he would later flesh out in his pamphlet on The 
Fundamental Issue. In short, there were three issues at stake for those who publicly 
opposed the Oath: First, the exclusion of communists from the faculty. The majority 
of the faculty would have agreed on that except they rejected the exclusion of a par-
ticular group in principle. Second, the new contract questioned the right for tenure 
as the new reappointment letter made continuation of the appointment on a year-
to-year basis contingent on the signing of the special oath. Third, the imposition of 
an additional anti-communist oath forced by the Regents (and not legitimized by the 
self-governance of the academic bodies) together with the impeachment of tenure 
raised serious concerns about academic freedom at large. 
2. Kantorowicz’s Appeal: Pretext to The Fundamental Issue
In this special meeting of the Northern Section of the Academic Senate a majority 
of the faculty present were willing to take the required constitutional oath. After all 
they were “good citizens.” Still many objected to take an additional oath that see-
med to them to be a “political test”. Kantorowicz considered this situation a personal 
insult against him as a professor and stateless academic citizen, and thus an affront 
to the caste of university teachers. In a letter to president Sproul, he entertained 
playing the role of the bad citizen, writing, “Dante, quoting Aristotle, has remarked 
that ‘every oblique action of government turns good men into bad citizens.’ I deeply 
deplore that under the impact of the recent events I feel compelled to reckon myself-
perhaps self-righteously-among the ‘bad academic citizens,’ since I cannot conform 
to the demands of the Board of Regents to sign a political oath.”39 When the renow-
ned psychologist Edward C. Tolman stated, “I cannot and will not sign the oath in 
its present form,” at the meeting he was intimidated by the huge audience. He refrai-
ned from lecturing but preferred to teach small graduate seminars.40 His colleague 
Kantorowicz, a brilliant orator, followed by reading a statement that did not even 
become part of the official minutes of the meeting, although some present conside-
red it to be the turning point in the debate. “Until Kantorowicz spoke,” remembered 
his young colleague, the historian and political activist Gordon Griffiths, “it would 
have been possible to dismiss the controversy as a local matter, a dispute between 
various parties at a California university.”41 But by discussing the Oath as a funda-
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mental issue of academic freedom on a world historical scale, Kantorowicz invol-
ved his colleagues in “universal questions” not only of academic but of “human free-
dom.”
As in his lectures, Kantorowicz had prepared a crisp and polished paper in ele-
gant English. The historian’s formal grandeur was well suited to Berkeley’s largest 
lecture hall. According to another eyewitness he delivered his statement “in strange 
rhythmical incantation, high-pitched with fervor, his foreign accent now and then 
making his words scarcely intelligible.”42 In his opening remarks he emphasized that 
he was speaking “[a]s a historian;”43 as a historian and humanist he felt competent 
to speak to “the grave dangers”44 of introducing an enforced oath. And it was from 
a “human point of view,”45 he insisted, that history could still teach us a lesson – at 
least for the occasion he was confident that historia both as history and experience 
was a magistra vitae.46 He did not speak about the history of oaths itself but about 
the historical implications that a discursive event such as the legal formula of the 
Oath could have. The formula, he argued, though seemingly harmless, would have 
unforeseeable consequences. He raised his voice not only to speak as a historian and 
world-renowned medievalist but as a German Jew who had to flee the Nazis and 
found his new home in California. “Eka lamented and cursed about the nonsense 
and the waste of time during this episode,” his friend Marion Dönhoff recalled, “but 
I believe that on the other hand he kind of enjoyed taking revenge on the American 
pseudo-Nazis for what the actual Nazis had done to him.”47 In a letter to his Berke-
ley colleague Raymond Sontag, he would explain that “You may find that it makes 
little difference whether a man is Christian or not so long as he bears in his heart an 
image of humanitas which is unshakable and uncompromising, and which may jus-
tify the mention of the name of God even in a Senate Meeting of a State University. 
You may include me with those you have castigated for scholarly pride, or you may 
call my ‘idealism’ Jewish or German. But I am, or try to be, both as Jew and as Ger-
man also an ‘eternal anti-Barbarus,’ no matter whether the Barbarianism be brown 
or black or red and emerges in the ugliness of Mr. Stalin, Mr. Hitler, or Mr.48 Neylan 
et consortes.”49 Obviously, to compare Neylan and other regents of the University of 
California to dictators was out of proportion. In that sense the comparison reveals 
Kantorowicz’s outrage about the situation. There he stood in front of his Ameri-
can colleagues using his scholarly authority to make both an historical and politi-
cal argument:
“All oaths in history that I know of, have undergone changes. A new word will 
be added. A short phrase, seemingly insignificant, will be smuggled in. The 
next step may be an inconspicuous change in the tense, from present to past, 
or from past to future.”50
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He was aware of the contingency of historical processes.51 The Loyalty Oath would 
have, as with other legal formulae “its own autonomous life,”52 as it implied a histori-
cal potential that could unfold in unpredictable ways. It was certainly unpredictable 
to both sides. Neither the Regents nor those who would affirm the Oath by taking 
it would be able to interfere with its fate. Even worse than the Oath’s wording, he 
added, were the circumstances of its imposition and implementation. The Regents 
did not have the legitimate authority to enforce a political oath. It was not only a vio-
lation of academic freedom, as Kantorowicz and others argued, but also a confusion 
of two different fields: the political and the academic. 
The historian’s voice changed accordingly. “Mussolini Italy of 1931, Hilter [sic] 
Germany of 1933, are terrifying and warning examples for the harmless bit-by-bit 
procedure in connection with political enforced oaths.”53 As a German Jew he was 
denied and doubtless would have refused to take the oath of loyalty to Hitler that 
was required by civil servants beginning in the summer of 1934. As a consequence, 
Kantorowicz had asked for his retirement, and emigrated to the United States. Yet 
for the historian of medieval oaths the fact that the Oath had to be taken under 
duress made it invalid. Yet Kantorowicz, who refused to understand the structural 
violence in the politics of medieval lordship, invoked dramatic language once his 
own privileges as a professor were endangered. He called the Regents’ politics “tyr-
anny” – the black-and-white imposition of an oath upon the faculty where the main 
alternative to signing was dismissal. One might argue that for a stateless exile like 
Kantorowicz the academic territory had become the ultimate sanctuary he could not 
but defend with all his might.
The good academic citizen and “scholar sworn to truth” found himself in a dou-
ble-bind, a “conflict of conscience.” What Kantorowicz considered to be a question 
of “human dignity,” was, in fact, a question about the status of the professor. The 
controversy around the Loyalty Oath was only the surface phenomenon of a deeper 
structural conflict. For the medievalist Kantorowicz scholars, priests, and judges 
were the three authorities entitled to wear a gown. He, moreover, viewed the profes-
sor not only as a scholar who follows the “call” of the institution54 but one who also 
listens to an inner “vocation,” as Max Weber had it.55 In a famous lecture of 1917, 
with which Kantorowicz was familiar, Weber had distinguished between the “pluto-
cratic” German and the “bureaucratic” American academic systems. 
American colleagues joined Weber in his critique of the American university 
system. Thorstein Veblen in his Higher Learning in America and Upton Sinclair’s The 
Goose Step: A Study in American Higher Education were both polemical reactions to 
contemporaries’ attempts to introduce business principles to the academic territory 
such as Frederick W. Taylor’s infamous suggestions for more corporate efficiency 
in academic institutions.56 As we can conclude from Weber’s account, one could 
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observe how the German academic system developed “in the direction of the Amer-
ican.”57 What was characteristic, according to Weber, was that large research univer-
sities such as Berkeley were “‘state capitalist’ enterprises,” which could not be “man-
aged without very considerable funds” and the means of new public management.58 
One of the consequences of this “Americanization” was, as Weber put it in Marxist 
terms, the “‘separation of the worker from his means of production.’ The worker, that 
is, the assistant, is dependent upon the implements that the state puts at his disposal; 
hence he is just as dependent upon the head of the institute as is the employee in a 
factory upon the management.”59 
Although Weber’s observations did not necessarily include the humanities (pri-
vate research libraries where still very common and sufficient by the time, and travel 
funds could become available through other sources), and may have even been fac-
tually inaccurate for the sciences, he, nevertheless, touched on an issue that became 
important in discussions surrounding the Loyalty Oath. Kantorowicz had dwelt on 
the issue ever since his conversation with Radin: While the garmented professor 
may be something between a priest and a judge in his right to wear a gown, and 
while he might consider himself part of an intellectual aristocracy beyond the dem-
ocratic logic of representation, in the eyes of American legal system, he was merely 
part of a corporation. In The Fundamental Issue Kantorowicz would return to this 
point in order to reply to regent Sidney M. Ehrman’s claim that university profes-
sors would be employees of the university, “not officers, in any sense of the word.”60 
The university could do without an institution framework or a place, he thought, but 
it could not do without professors, who were willing to share knowledge with their 
students in a space that was created for thinking without a particular purpose. 
From the very beginning, Kantorowicz, among many others, considered this step 
taken by the Regents of the University as a violation of the principles of shared gov-
ernance, academic freedom, and tenure. According to Kantorowicz, the reason why 
this moment in the history of academic freedom turned into a fundamental issue 
was the impossibility of exchange between the “temporary or temporal advantages” 
of political small change and “permanent of eternal values.”61 This step taken by the 
Regents, he insisted, was “a shameful and undignified action” and “an affront and 
a violation of both human sovereignty and professional dignity.”62 They had “dared 
to bully the bearer of this gown into a situation in which – under the pressure of a 
bewildering economic coercion – he is compelled to give up either his tenure or, 
together with his freedom of judgment, his human dignity and his responsible sov-
ereignty as a scholar.”63
And in a final appeal Kantorowicz reminded his colleagues of the direct respon-
sibility to their scholarly conscience. It pointed to the inner sovereignty of the pro-
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fessor, who should be the very last to allow himself to act under duress and yield to 
pressure.
3. Splendid Isolation
Let us now consider Kantorowicz’s situation at the time he was speaking to the large 
crowd of faculty at the special Senate meeting. In some ways, Kantorowicz was still 
enjoying his splendid isolation, full of “Eucalyptus trees,” with a “tremendous view 
over the bay,” as Karl Löwith wrote on his way to Berkeley: “I am going to E. Kanto-
rowicz, who has now secularized his George universe.”64 Having arrived on the other 
side of the Atlantic, Kantorowicz was fighting what he could not accept as inevita-
ble: the “Americanization” of the academic territory as I sketched earlier. Back in 
Heidelberg he had written against the progressive Americanization of Germany.65 
In that sense, “Berkeley, must have appeared to him as one of the few strongholds 
of corporate order and lawful unity which were left. It therefore makes sense that 
he acted with total commitment in the famous controversy over the Loyalty Oath. 
There could be but one inseparable loyalty.”66 After he was forced to retire from his 
chair in medieval history at Frankfurt, Kantorowicz traded an initial appointment 
at John’s Hopkins that had earned him a visa for the position at Berkeley,67 a precari-
ous and “quasi-proletarian”68 position, to borrow Weber’s words, that came without 
tenure and was granted to most professors who had fled Nazi Germany. However he 
received a pension from the University of Frankfurt even when teaching at Berkeley. 
This was relevant for Kantorowicz’s position during the Loyalty Oath controversy as 
the issue of tenure was typically an institutional prerequisite for academic freedom.
The punch card of Kantorowicz’s personnel file in the Berkeley university archive 
tracks his employment history. On the very top, right it indicates his status: “Alien.” 
His initial appointment as “Professor of Medieval of History (one year only)” was 
followed by an appointment as Research Associate, Lecturer, Lecturer and Research 
Associate (all in History, 1940–1943); in 1943 his appointment was obviously 
arranged through the contacts he had established with friends and colleagues of the 
Colloqium Orientalicum since he was appointed “Lecturer, Foreign Language and 
Area, Far Eastern (A.S.T.P.)” for 1943–44. In 1944–45 he was again Lecturer in His-
tory, and finally appointed as “Professor in History,” 1945–46 with annual reappoint-
ments until 1949, when his official status was “on Sabbatical leave, in residence,” 
enjoying his full salary during the year of the Oath; in fact he was reappointed with 
an adjusted salary for 1950–51 on July 21, 1950, and “Dismissed for refusal to sign 
non-communist declaration, July 1, 1950” in August of 1950 after his case had been 
discussed in meetings of the Regents on June 23, and July 21 of the same year.
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Despite the infaust conditions of his appointment, Kantorowicz saw Berkeley 
as his final destiny. He enjoyed his splendid isolation on campus and the poetic 
views of the Bay available from his new home close to the university’s North Gate. 
He famously enjoyed sitting on his deck in bright sunlight while eating strawber-
ries and thinking about the dark and secret Germany he had left behind. For years 
the permanent appointment of one of the most famous historians of the past cen-
tury was not, in other words, a pressing matter for president Sproul. Only later did 
the Regents discover whom they were about to let go.69 Although the administration 
was happy to have Kantorowicz around, it repeatedly put off creating a permanent 
position for him. In a letter to the chair of the history department, president Sproul 
welcomed an “arrangement which would keep Dr. Ernst Kantorowicz on the cam-
pus” but only if the money came from somewhere “other than our general funds.”70 
So-called friends of the university had already once before helped out in this situ-
ation. Sproul would only agree to an appointment “provided he understands fully 
that we are not incurring an obligation, either legal or moral, by retaining him.”71 We 
can assume that Kantorowicz was aware of the administration’s position since parts 
of the correspondence are found in his personal archive. This, and the fact that he 
was not a naturalized American citizen, also kept him from the obligation to sign 
even the original oath of allegiance of the State of California. The emigrant, who had 
not yet fully arrived, lacked political rights but enjoyed the freedom of statelessness. 
After ten years of this limbo, he was finally granted a permanent position in the his-
tory department. He never wanted to leave his house on Euclid Avenue ever again. 
By the time he had “became a one-man humanities department for a coterie of 
brilliant poets, writers, linguists, economists, artists and law students who crowded 
the tiny classroom to audit his incredible courses in the 13th Century, the Renais-
sance, and English Constitutional History.”72 He had managed to build a commu-
nity around his passion for the aesthetic of history. Yet he was still not the type of 
scholar that is called a “good citizen” on campuses in the United States: He was not 
interested in serving on committees or being involved in other kinds of university 
politics. Joining the faculty at the University of Frankfurt as an academic outsider, 
he had even ridiculed what he called a “spiritual circumcision,” that is, his arrival to 
the academic territory with his assumption of the office of professor.73 He spent most 
of his time at Berkeley with a hand full of friends and groups of different students, 
who would pick him up after class and take him from one coffee shop to another, 
fascinated by the charming and charismatic European scholar whose classy appear-
ance must have been a spectacle. As a former member of the George-Kreis, he had, 
of course, cultivated his scholarly self-fashioning, and became something of an aca-
demic dandy who liked to plan elaborate dinners with sophisticated menus that cre-
ated a stimulating atmosphere for intellectual conversation. 
131ÖZG 25 | 2014 | 3
In the very same meeting in which Kantorowicz had delivered his statement, a 
Senate Committee on Academic Freedom was appointed to negotiate with president 
Sproul. Over the next few months, all attempts to abrogate or introduce an alterna-
tive failed.74 Yet those negotiations raised a broad range of concerns and resulted in 
slight revisions to the Oath’s wording that some considered an adequate compro-
mise. The Regents voted unanimously in its favor. However, neither the question of 
communism nor the impeachment of tenure was changed. 
By the end of June about sixty faculty members gathered at Berkeley’s Faculty 
Club to organize against the Oath, becoming a partisan Group for Academic Free-
dom. This group of so-called “non-signers” and their sympathizers formally organ-
ized in November. Its chairman was the previously mentioned renowned psycholo-
gist Tolman. For their constitution they adopted an open letter to president Sproul 
demonstrating their “conviction that the University must uphold the personal free-
dom and integrity of the scholar and the individual and must maintain the operating 
autonomy of the Faculty and of the President in matters of Faculty appointment and 
dismissal.”75 Among the twenty-two signers of the letter was also the name of Ernst 
Kantorowicz, who had joined the group, even though he usually kept himself out of 
this kind of business. Already during his time in Frankfurt he had maintained a dis-
tant relationship to academic politics. Therefore, it was only consistent that he con-
tinued to flirt with being an outsider on the Berkeley campus. And he even insisted 
on being alone although he was formally a member of the Group for Academic Free-
dom. Unsurprisingly Kantorowicz replied with an inimitably short letter when the 
non-signers were offered placements in other institutions: “No. Eka”76
4. Academic Freedom
Only a month later, and long before the deadline of October 1, half of the faculty 
signed the Oath, and thereby agreed, although implicitly, to a new regime of corpo-
rate governance by putting their usucapted tenure rights on the line without further 
ado. The Committee on Academic Freedom together with a group of distinguis-
hed faculty communicated to the president that opposition to the Oath persisted. It 
became clear that there was no longer controversy over the presence of communist 
faculty. In an attempt to compromise, the senate brought forward two resolutions. 
One prohibited the employment of anyone “whose commitments or obligations to 
any organization, Communist or other, prejudice impartial scholarship and the free 
pursuit of truth”; the other, suggested making signature of only the Californian con-
stitutional oath necessary. After ongoing negotiations between the different univer-
sity bodies and the Regents, the latter agreed to release appointment letters for the 
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academic year to all faculty who had not yet signed the Oath.77 This pragmatic inter-
vention was meant to continue the academic business, since no university could 
afford to loose half of its faculty over night, if only for practical reasons. Yet, both the 
Northern and Southern sections of the Academic Senate passed resolutions of con-
cern and opposition against the Oath and the enduring position of the Regents on 
the matter.78 There were two main issues at stake, the right for tenure as well as, more 
importantly, the corporate autonomy of the faculty and their academic freedom.
Certainly most academics agree to the principle of academic freedom. Yet, how-
ever that freedom is defined, we must admit that it is the university where such ques-
tions are raised and discussed. While I unconditionally agree to the necessity of aca-
demic freedom, as a historian, I can see no justification for academic freedom in 
principle. I would further argue that there is no continuous tradition of academic 
freedom ever since its emergence within the medieval university system, but rather a 
long discontinuous fight for it. Academics must, therefore, claim their territory and 
the sovereignty to define its rules. Pierre Bourdieu once demanded that the sociolo-
gist was a lawgiver; he was to define and determine the laws of social life independ-
ent from the rules of what he called other social fields. In other words, the academic 
territory was not to be confused with a political arena or a market place. It had to 
follow its own rules per definition and without concessions; otherwise, it would for-
feit its integrity. 
As important as the principle of academic sovereignty is, it does not have any 
philosophical or other presuppositions for its support. The pragmatist philoso-
pher Richard Rorty has taken a similar position: “A number of contemporary phi-
losophers, including myself, do their best to complicate the traditional distinctions 
between the objective and the subjective, reason and passion, knowledge and opin-
ion, science and politics. We offer contentious reinterpretations of these distinc-
tions, draw them in non-traditional ways. […] So we are often accused of endan-
gering the traditions and practices which people have in mind when they speak of 
‘academic freedom’ or ‘scientific integrity’ or ‘scholarly standards.’”79 In defending 
his position against a dogmatic realist understanding of Western rationality80 and 
truth he took a pluralist view by insisting on the necessity of rationality and truth 
for an understanding of academic freedom. For him it does not matter which notion 
of academic freedom we choose as long as we can agree on its indispensability. Cer-
tainly, the “effective defense of universities requires political will,” as David Hollinger 
emphasized, “and a certain amount of solidarity across disciplines and schools.”81 
It is, nevertheless, both possible to disagree with those pragmatist positions as 
well as necessary to oppose to them, as they tend to create some sort of double-bind. 
As a result academic freedom can only be claimed by an institutional commitment. 
Yet we can only understand the conditions and the very character of this agreement 
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if we accept that it is not self-evident. We may assume the ideal of an “uncondi-
tional university,” as Jacques Derrida has put it. This ideal formulation of academic 
freedom makes both it as well as the university as its institutional place vulnera-
ble: If this “unconditionality, in principle and de jure, makes for the invincible force 
of the university, it has never been in effect. By reason of this abstract and hyper-
bolic invincibility, and by its very impossibility, this unconditionality also exposes 
the weakness or the vulnerability of the university.”82 This exposition and the expo-
sure to vulnerability allows us to rethink the very notion of academic freedom in 
principle. Derrida presumes here, in some respects similar to Kantorowicz, that the 
university’s claim goes in principle and unconditionally beyond what could ever be 
realized institutionally. He insists on the ideal of “unconditional freedom” against 
what is to be assumed as a democratic right of “academic freedom” within the limits 
of the right of free speech. In many European countries, say Germany and France, 
academic freedom is granted by constitutional rights. In the United States, a claim 
for academic freedom can be made on a legal basis only as a private pronouncement. 
Only since the Supreme Court decision of 1967 in Keyishian v. Board of Regents did 
the justices rule that academic freedom was of “transcendent value to all of us and 
not merely to the teachers concerned,” and would, therefore, be a special concern of 
the first constitutional amendment.83 In Derrida’s universe of thought these forms of 
legitimizing the right for academic freedom come to an unacceptable prize: With his 
investiture into office, the individual scholar became indebted to the institution that 
would guarantee his privilege and safeguard his academic freedom.
From a historical perspective we should consider American notions of academic 
freedom as well as the University of California’s understanding of it before the Loy-
alty Oath controversy.84 Academic freedom in the United States is based on the Dec-
laration of Principles of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). 
In 1915, the year of the association’s foundation, it defined fundamental profes-
sional principles and values of the academic profession. The understanding of aca-
demic freedom in this founding document was based on the assumption that educa-
tion was a contribution to the public good, an understanding that historically dates 
back to the emergence of the first American colleges in the early 17th century when 
their purpose was to graduate “men of cloth” and “lettered gentlemen.”85 Among the 
authors of the 1915 Declaration were renowned scholars like Arthur O. Lovejoy and 
John Dewey.86 
In his 1902 essay on Academic Freedom the latter had defended institutions of 
higher education against the influence donors and donor interests. He considered 
the gift of a great teacher to be more important for the history of a university than 
any amount of money given to it. This position was based on belief in the university’s 
truth-function within society. “The one thing that is inherent and essential [to the 
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idea of the university] is the idea of truth.”87 For Dewey, however, the basis of Aca-
demic Freedom was civil rights and the state’s ability to defend them. On the other 
hand, the “social function” of American colleges was “to help students see that the 
national narrative around which their socialization has centered is an open-ended 
one.”88 In their 1915 declaration, the AAUP discussed cases of professors teaching 
“in ways objectionable to the trustees,” and did not hesitate to defend the university 
as a “contagious center of intellectual enthusiasm,” where it was better for students 
to “think about heresies than not to think at all”.89 
Members of the faculty were considered to be “self-regulating, independent 
‘appointees’” whose mission was the production of knowledge and the pursuit of 
scientific truth independent from any intervention by its trustees.90 In that sense 
they “embody the function of the university and so warrant the protection of aca-
demic freedom.”91 Following a series of conferences in which American professors 
discussed questions of academic freedom, the association released Principles on Aca-
demic Freedom and Tenure in 1940. It was a restatement of the 1915 document refor-
mulating some basic ideas about the very character of the academic territory. More 
than 200 scholarly and educational groups in the country endorsed it. Its purpose 
was “to promote public understanding and support of academic freedom and ten-
ure and agreement upon procedures to ensure them in colleges and universities” 
since academic institutions would contribute to the common good through the “free 
search for truth and its free exposition.”92 Academic freedom was considered essen-
tial for both research and teaching. Tenure was understood as “a means to certain 
ends”: to allow for “freedom of teaching and research” independent of economic 
pressure.93 This freedom would be “indispensable to the success of an institution in 
fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society.” Professors should be “entitled 
to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject” – still, they had to be “care-
ful” not to introduce “controversial matter”.94 This understanding of academic free-
dom “rested on the assumption that knowledge and power were separable; the pur-
suit of truth ought to have nothing to do with public conflicts of interest.”95 Thus the 
university was concerned with its truth-finding function while the trustees where 
supposed to protect it. Professors considered themselves as academic citizens, as 
“members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution” who 
should be entitled to permanent or continuous tenure.96 
The AAUP’s statement points to one of the problems of the American civil uni-
versity: it was and still is considered a “deeply moral enterprise” and was granted 
a privileged position for this reason alone. This situation may also to some extent 
explain why Kantorowicz felt at home on the Berkeley campus: it resembled a mon-
astery in many respects. It was not like Paris, the prototype of the European medi-
eval university, an urban space engaged with public life.97 It was not a playground 
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for intellectuals who got involved in public or even political debate. But rather it was 
and is a sacred, though secular, space of scholarship.98 
5. The Garmented Profession
Kantorowicz did not consider The Fundamental Issue to be a scholarly piece in the 
strict sense of the word. Although he was speaking as an historian, he was obvi-
ously not restricting himself to professional standards. He did not include the essay 
in his list of publications that he had to update regularly so as to document his track 
record for the university administration.99 It was instead an exercise in the Cali-
fornian episode of a longer mythistory of academic freedom. The pattern of argu-
mentation in The Fundamental Issue is similar to earlier writings of Kantorowicz: it 
was once again a Mythenschau100 of, this time, the medieval academic culture, yet 
again based on erudite scholarship that Kantorowicz consciously left aside. As the 
medievalist Bernhard Jussen implicitly suggests when talking about the King’s Two 
Bodies’s “unacceptable empirical strategy,” the “empirical validity” of Kantorowicz’s 
work still remains to be confirmed or questioned.101 Neither his major work on Fre-
derick II, which he infamously published without footnotes,102 nor his most famous 
work on the semantics of medieval constitutional history, The King’s Two Bodies, ins-
pired the argumentative strategy of Kantorowicz’s pamphlet on the Oath. He star-
ted instead with an unpublished lecture entitled The Secret Germany. What all of 
these works, nevertheless, shared with The Fundamental Issue was the fabrication of 
a “new Middle Ages.”103
The Secret Germany was a remarkable lecture, both concealing and unveiling. 
It was a text written in an unparalleled moment of radical political transformation. 
We can view it in different ways as a blueprint for the argumentative structure that 
Kantorowicz adopted in The Fundamental Issue. Kantorowicz had delivered this lec-
ture as a second inaugural lecture at the beginning of his last semester at Frankfurt 
University, before he left Nazi Germany for the last time. I will analyze his use of 
mythic and timeless figures and show how they allowed him to write a history that 
values aesthetics and mythical dimensions at least as much as empirical accuracy in 
establishing an ethically normative discourse. While Kantorowicz explicitly claims 
that truth is regulative for scholarly discourse, he does not in fact pay much atten-
tion to it.
Kantorowicz dedicated the first lecture of his course in medieval history, which 
he taught after being reinstalled following a recess in 1933, to The Secret Germany. 
Karl Wolfskehl, another member of the infamous George circle, had earlier intro-
duced the concept.104 According to him there was a sphere of dormant forces, in 
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which the “future sublime being of the Nation had preformed and embodied 
itself.”105 It was his final tribute to a conservative, if not proto-Nazi, Germany.106 This 
secret Germany was “a realm of mystery and myth”107. It was steeped in mythistory, 
which maybe was the source of Kantorowicz’s fascination with the past. In his inim-
itable style he wrote: 
“Aber wer Augen hat zu sehen und Ohren zu hören, der weiss, dass fast zu 
allen Zeiten, seit es ein “Deutsches” im emphatischen Sinne des Worts gab, bis 
zum heutigen Tag unabhängig von dem jeweiligen Zustand, der jeweiligen Ver-
fassung des Reichs immer noch ein andres Deutschland gewesen ist, welchem 
jenseits des öffentlichen sichtbaren Deutschland Wesen und Leben beschie-
den war. Es ist ein Seelenreich, in welchem immerdar die gleichen deutsches-
ten Kaiser eigensten Ranges und eigenster Artung herrschen und thronen, 
unter deren Zepter sich zwar noch niemals die ganze Nation aus innerster 
Inbrunst gebeugt hat, deren Herrentum aber dennoch immerwährend und 
ewig ist und in tiefster Verborgenheit gegen das jeweilige Aussen lebt und 
dafür für das ewige Deutschland.”108
According to this mythistorical understanding there existed an undying eternal 
realm of emphatic, genuine German-ness, secretly hidden in its ahistorical truth. 
It was a country without a territory, an association among the heroes of German 
history and culture. A realm of the foremost souls of every generation united in an 
exaggerated historical-a-historical Reich of myth (Mythenreich) that “is present and 
absent at the very same time, together temporal and eternal.”109 It informed the best 
man of an ever-evolving ideal Empire that could become identical with the actual 
Reich.
5.1 The Professor With an Attitude
Kantorowicz understood the academic territory as a universitas magistrorum et scho-
larium, which he envisioned as the idealized model of an eternal realm of schol-
arship. This mythistory of the academic territory was perhaps a necessary histo-
rical fiction driven by wishful thinking about academia’s past as it both embraced 
and embodied Émile Durkheim’s idea of history as the true unconscious of the uni-
versity as an institution. Kantorowicz used history here in a peculiar way in order 
to bring the Californian moment in the fight for academic freedom into conversa-
tion with a discontinuous history that he imagined as a never-changing ideal realm. 
The issue of academic jurisdiction, nevertheless, “remained difficult to define and 
was a source of continual conflict.”110 It was a realm defined by the ideals of cons-
tant ethical values like Humanitas and Bildung. Yet the actual constitution of the ter-
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ritory was only incidental to the fundamental issue at stake. This was true for both 
the secret Germany and the idealized Arcadia of Scholarship. Kantorowicz under-
stood Humanism along the lines of the “Third Humanism” of Weimar Germany, a 
defense of Bildung and the virtues of a humanist tradition.111 In this way the poetic 
tradition was more important to him than scholarly virtues. Mali thus suggests that 
“it was Dante, not Frederick, who was the real hero” of Kantorowicz’s contentious 
first book.112 From his own point of view, the Fundamental Issue was the defense of 
Humanitas herself. Whenever she was involved, he claimed, “I cannot keep silent. 
I prefer to fight.”113 His final chapter of The King’s Two Bodies would describe the 
humanist baptism of Dante, crowned by Virgil, as an act of becoming a member of 
the “corpus mysticum Adae quod est humanitas.”114 This attitude informs not only 
this pamphlet but also Kantorowicz’s scholarly work at large. Kantorowicz under-
stood the historical discipline as Gesinnungswissenschaft.115 As a consequence, when 
speaking “as a historian,” he would speak about the history of academic freedom 
with an attitude – to say the least. He would place value, once again, upon the mythi-
cal elements of the past as facts of a medieval imaginary without feeling the need to 
attend equally to res gestae.
The rhetoric of Kantorowicz’s pamphlet was remarkable in avoiding the immedi-
ate legal or institutional context of the Loyalty Oath. This was a political fight Kan-
torowicz left to his colleagues, in particular to other members of the Group for Aca-
demic freedom, that is, first and foremost, Tolman. The group had hired a conserv-
ative lawyer and appealed through him against the implementation of the Oath in 
court in various instances.116 While Kantorowicz preferred to keep a low profile in 
the political ground combat, he, nevertheless, published his thoughts in a short, 
ironic, and cardinal essay on academic freedom, an essay on the attitude about aca-
demic freedom and its fundamental, unchanging medieval form.
As mentioned earlier, the essay was framed as a mythistory of the medieval tra-
dition of academic freedom. What appears to be a continuous medieval tradition 
in Kantorowicz’s terms was more likely a discontinuous history in a struggle for an 
academic ideal. In the autumn of the Middle Ages, Jacques Le Goff insists, “that the 
foundations of academic specificity and dignity, as defined from Abelard to Siger of 
Brabant, had either crumbled or been undermined.”117 Certainly, by the 13th century, 
the new caste of scholars had become aware not only of their “existence as a body”118 
but also of the need to defend the social field they had come to inhabit against hostile 
enemies. There was hardly a moment in this long history that was free of the strug-
gle for academic freedom. 
It was and remains problematic when universities become subjected to public 
management. Kantorowicz and the many critics before and after him seem rightfully 
concerned by the exposure of educational institutions to the adverse logics of accel-
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eration, efficiency, or simple measurement of impact. The trustees of a university 
should doubtless act to safeguard the university’s autonomy and protect it against 
outside influences and anti-intellectual resentments. Yet ever since the Middle Ages 
the professor was also involved in the trade of words: “Besides differentiating itself 
from the monastic world, this new social group of scholars more generally asserted 
that to live in any way other than by its special profession and its own type of labor 
was impossible and repellent.”119 This was exactly about making a difference between 
the scholar or professor and similar social groups. During the formative phase of the 
profession, the cleric had to choose between intellectual and manual labor. Le Goff 
argues that it was scholars’ commitment to a new form of work – not only their sta-
tus – that made them solely interested in trading on its knowledge. 
Kantorowicz’s anxiety that the Regents would commit a revolutionary act of 
turning teaching into a “trade” was not only an historical misunderstanding but also 
a misinterpretation of the profession’s conditions of possibility. But was it really the 
Regents of the University of California in the mid-20th century who took this revolu-
tionary step? Or was it, to follow Le Goff, not the professors in the 12th century who 
for the first time entered the trade of words in order to create the academic freedom 
Kantorowicz was envisioning? Scholarly life is a trade: “negotia scholaria.” Intellec-
tual autonomy only comes as the prize of a certain income secured by the institu-
tion.120 If it was still true that the professor was all too close to the judge and the 
priest, was it not the task of the university teacher – and the historian in particular – 
to emphasize the differences between the garmented professions rather than sing the 
praises to their collective exceptional status? If the robe was what they had in com-
mon, then what was it that distinguished them from each other? 
5.2 The Janitor is not a Professor
Kantorowicz chose to pick a curious comparison for his argument against the 
Regents. For him it was more important to distinguish the professor from the jani-
tor than to elaborate on the differences between the professor and the other gar-
mented professions. But what was the difference between janitors and professors? 
According to regent Ehrman there was none, since both were “employees of the 
Regents.”121 They could be hired and fired at the will of the trustees. But the janitors, 
Kantorowicz contended, are at least unionized but there was no union of university 
professors, except, one could have reminded him, for the American Association of 
University Professors, which had been founded on the principles of academic free-
dom and tenure. 
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Kantorowicz’s answer was simple: They cannot form a union “because the pro-
fessors together with the students are the University,” they are, following a medieval 
tradition, the universitas magistrorum et scholarium.122 According to this ideal they 
together form a corporate body of students and masters. The professors built a cor-
poration that coincided with the corporate body they served. This constitution of 
the discontinuous medieval tradition of the University had been translated into an 
American Republican version based on the claim of academic freedom and tenure 
guaranteed through democratic principles of civil rights and free speech. “Teachers 
and students,” Kantorowicz went on, “together are the University regardless of the 
existence of gardens and buildings, or care-takers of gardens and buildings.”123 Once 
again, Kantorowicz did not care for the actual institutional context but was dream-
ing of an ideal university that in fact had never materialized but remained the wish-
ful thinking of academics even in medieval times. 
In this way Kantorowicz reveled in a mythopoetic vision of a university without 
buildings, classrooms, laboratories, libraries, or janitors for that matter. He dreamed 
of the university’s essence as no more than “the body of teachers and students.”124 
Such an academic utopia could only exist in the realm of mythistory. While pro-
fessors had “certain vested rights in the institution, which they both serve and con-
stitute,”125 they were irreducible to those vestments. The professor, therefore, had 
both a physical and a social body. But was it not Kantorowicz who had taught us 
that there is always more than one body? Such an idealized version of the university 
could never truly materialize. What was the corporate body of the university with-
out its flesh? 
5.3 The Professor as a Lab Rat
Following Kantorowicz’s traces in the collections of the Bancroft library, Randolph 
Starn once made a striking and lucid observation: “Yet at the same time as these soa-
ring declarations actual history and memory, the repressed and, ghostlike, actual 
bodies return in archival traces, and we find ourselves in a scenario where history is 
not transcended.” Kantorowicz, he argued, the “cultivated erudite, the enemy of cen-
sorship, and defender of academic principle” would be, even or in particular in the 
archive, “still caught up in an unmastered past, his own and his century’s.”126 Kan-
torowicz was indeed enmeshed in an unmastered past, but perhaps because he had 
tried to transcend history in writing a quasi-sacred, venerable history of academic 
freedom that sought to reestablish the foundations of the academic territory and 
elevate the caste of the professor beyond tribal boondoggle. Following Kantorwicz’s 
argument about the Oath, one comes to understand why Durkheim in his study of 
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secondary education in France had insisted that it was “history which is the true 
unconscious,”127 the true unconscious of an institution that actually was not identical 
with the historical fiction of a universitas magistrorum et scholarium. The American 
campus university was part of a nostalgic New World reminiscence on a European 
past, a 19th-century renaissance of an idealized tradition, an academic heterotopia 
that presented itself as the territory for a novel form of academic freedom.
After the Group for Academic Freedom won their law suit Tolman et al. v. Regents 
there is one last entry: “Resignation accepted,” on October of 1953 when Kantoro-
wicz had already accepted an appointment as permanent member of the Institute 
for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, yet another, though quite different, 
academic territory. It was perhaps closer to Kantorowicz’s personal ideal; not at all 
a universitas magistrorum et scholarium but an academic institution where one was 
paid not to work but to exist, as he wrote to his friend.128
Kantorowicz obviously left Berkeley in anger, bridges burnt. There is no letter of 
farewell to one of Berkeley’s most distinguished scholars of the 20th century. It was 
a different for Tolman, Kantorowicz’s equally distinguished colleague in psychol-
ogy, who had led the Group for Academic Freedom to success. In a remarkable let-
ter to Tolman president Sproul, the originator of the oath in denial of its author-
ship, expressed his gratitude for Tolman’s 36 years of service to the university. “The 
impress of your genius” Tolman had left upon the department of psychology “long 
before the recent unhappy break in continuity that deprived us of more than two years 
of your services, and this fame had spread with your own wherever the social sci-
ences are known.”129 And he continues in surprisingly open self-criticism that these 
words were nothing but an “encomium from an ignorant administrator [Sproul 
about Sproul!].”130 Tolman’s reply to Sproul is friendly; but only at a first glance. “It is 
good of you,” he wrote, “to have said all the kind things that you did about my rela-
tions with the University and with this Department.” He accepted “with pleasure” 
to stay affiliated with his department and hoped to continue his work for several 
years.131 But he could not refrain from enclosing an offprint of his address at a spe-
cial convocation at McGill University he had given in June of 1954. 
“Again,” he writes with irony, “I have used rats to point to a human moral.”132 
Indeed, Tolman’s paper was about the truth-seeking professor-as-a-rat. Tolman had 
spent most of his professional career experimenting on rats, and now spoke about 
his research in the form of a fable about academic freedom and truth. In a more than 
obvious allusion to the recent issue of tenure at his home institution he writes: “It has 
been found, for example, that non hungry rats learn best the ‘truth’ that there is food 
in a given alley of a maze if they are not at the same time too thirsty or too frightened 
or too something else.”133 After going on for some paragraphs about the rat in search 
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of truth, he draws “some human parallels,” and speaks about himself, the hypotheti-
cal professor-as-rat. 
“Suppose that, in addition to having a need to write a good speech, he is also 
driven by two other strong practical needs  – a need to support his family 
and a need not to be rejected by his fellows. Suppose, in short, that he has a 
strong fear that his family may starve and a strong fear that what he says will 
lead him into conflict with the current climate of opinion. What will hap-
pen? Such strong fear needs will also decrease his pure cognitive appraisal of 
the ideas to be put into his speech. He will write a cautious, timid speech.”134
What he was saying was “that any teacher, if he is to be what our liberal society ‘says’ 
it wants him to be – namely, an open-minded, objective proponent of, and searcher 
for, truth – must then not be subjected to too strong economic fears or too strong 
social attacks.”135 As an academic he was embracing that society granted him “this 
somewhat specially privileged position,” which, in turn, he “ must take care not to 
abuse.”136
“Even rats will learn (and sometimes faster) how to get to food when there are 
fearful electric shocks along the way. Hence, if our need as human beings for 
a liberal society be passionate enough, if our demands for freedom, for fair 
play, for honesty, for open minds, and for simple human decency really be 
overwhelming (and basically I believe they are), then whatever our fears and 
distorting mechanisms we men will continue to seek the truth.”137
Today, there is a curious invisible monument to the non-signers on the Berkeley 
Campus. While it does not, in fact, exist, people keep talking about it. And if you 
ask someone about it, they are not certain if they have seen it. This may be true 
necessarily for other sub-urban legends but in this case it reiterates two aspects of 
Kantorowicz’s interpretation of the Loyalty Oath and its afterlife on the Berkeley 
campus. 
This invisible, yet imaginary, monument is supposed to be a plaque inside the 
Sather Tower, Berkeley’s landmark campus building, with the names of all non-sign-
ers of the Oath. Installing a plaque like this would have been a remarkable gesture 
viewing the non-signers as martyrs in a fight for academic freedom. This was, as I 
have tried to show, very much Kantorowicz’s understanding of his engagement in a 
political issue that he implied had world historical dimensions. He fashioned him-
self as a scholar rising above the low lands of the academic territory, as one of those 
few academics whose work and very existence should be regarded as exemplary of 
true dedication and commitment to academia. His way of speaking about the Oath 
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elevated a local incident to the level of a mythistorical moment in the history of aca-
demic freedom.
It was years after both Tolman’s and Kantorowicz’s death when the University of 
California decided to commission a monument for free speech and academic free-
dom. This again was an invisible monument of some sort. In 1989, the Berkeley Art 
Project held a public competition to create a monument to commemorate the 25th 
anniversary of the Free Speech Movement that ever since 1964 had contributed to 
Berkeley’s reputation as not just another elite university campus but as a place of true 
commitment and scholarship. “[A]t the time the university did not want to com-
memorate the Free Speech Movement in any way, shape, or form.” The administra-
tion was not happy about this gift by a “bunch of professors, ex-professors,”138 or was 
it rats? In fact, “they hated this piece in particular,”139 claimed the artist.
Mark Brest van Kempen, a then-graduate student at the San Francisco Art Insti-
tute, had designed a sculpture called “Column of Earth and Air” that created an 
invisible space. It played with the idea of “laws and politics as kind of material to 
work with.”140 A granite plate on the very plaza that was named after former presi-
dent Sproul encloses a six-inch circle of soil and space above it. The inscription on 
the granite reads: “This soil and the air space extending above it shall not be a part 
of any nation and shall not be subject to any entity’s jurisdiction.” This echoes the 
opening sentences of the speech Tolman had given at McGill and sent to president 
Sproul: “An occasion such as this, a Convocation of a Great University in a great and 
intellectually free country, where scholars have gathered from many lands – testi-
fies once again to the fact that science, reason, and the life of the mind are, and shall 
remain, international.”141 There were no boundaries, he insisted, “national or oth-
erwise, which can separate truth from truth.”142 It was Kantorowicz who had tried 
to create a similar space of academic freedom beyond the ravages of time and out-
side national boundaries or academic territories yet not by artistic but mythistori-
cal means. 
*  I want to thank the anonymous reviewers for their time, valuable comments, and suggestions. The 
staff of Bancroft Library helped with the archival research for this paper. Without the intellectual 
charm of Albert Müller and Wolfgang Neurath I would have never started working on it in the first 
place. Beate Fricke, Randy Starn, and Henning Trüper read and commented on earlier drafts of what 
would have never turned into a final version without Andrew Griebler’s editorial work and his intel-
lectual engagement with my writing.
143ÖZG 25 | 2014 | 3
Notes
1 Max Radin (* March 29, 1880 in Kempen; † June 22, Berkeley) was an US legal scholar and professor 
of Law at the University of California, Berkeley; see Ward W. Briggs, Radin, Max, in: Ward W. Briggs, 
ed., Biographical Dictionary of North American Classicists, Westport, CT, et al. 1994, 514–515.
2 Frederick Maitland, Selected Essays, Cambridge, UK 1936.
3 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology, xvii. For a 
discussion of this in different context cf. Joseph Mali’s chapter on Kantorowicz in Mythistory. The 
Making of Modern Historiography, Chicago, Ill. 2003.
4 Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies, xvii.
5 For the case of Berkeley see Mary Soo and Cathryn Carson, Managing the research university: Clark 
Kerr and the University of California, in: Minerva 42 (2004), 215–236.
6 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York 1975, 244. Kantorowicz comments in 
similar terms on the emergence of early modern Europe in The King’s Two Bodies, 286f.
7 See Blauner’s chapter on How the Oath Changed a University, a Nation, and People’s Lives, in McCar-
thyism, 220–232. 
8 A look at the list of non-signers supports this claim; only about 25 percent did not teach in the huma-
nities and social sciences. There is also anecdotal evidence to support this, e.g. in the notes of the 
meetings of the Group for Academic Freedom there is reoccurring reference to “an engineer” or “a 
scientist” for the list of speakers. The anonymous reference indicates that they were not considered as 
part of the group.
9 William Ray Dennes, Philosophy and the University Since 1915, An Interview Conducted by Joann 
Dietz Ariff, Berkeley 1970, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Regional Oral His-
tory Office, 102.
10 See for the history of Big Science Peter Galison, Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research, 
Stanford, CA 1992; Mary Jo Nye, Before Big Science: The Pursuit of Modern Chemistry and Physics, 
1800–1940, Cambridge, Mass. 1999.
11 Donald Alexander Downs, Restoring Free Speech and Liberty on Campus, Oakland, CA/Cambridge, 
UK, xiv.
12 The existing scholarship on the history of Academic Freedom is extensive; most remarkable are Alan 
Charles Kors/Harvey A. Silvergate, The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America’s 
Campuses, 1998.
13 Louis Menand, The Limits of Academic Freedom, in: Id., ed., The Future of Academic Freedom, Chi-
cago, Ill. 1996, 3–21, 3.
14 In many ways Kantorowicz’s understanding of the university in its idealized medieval form is the 
exact opposite of Tony Becher/Paul Trowler, Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual Enquiry 
and the Culture of Disciplines, 2nd Ed., Buckingham/Philadelphia, 2001.
15 Martin Jay, Foreword, in: Alain Boureau, Kantorowicz: Stories of a Historian, Baltimore, ML, vii–xii, 
ix.
16 Ibid.
17 Henning Trüper, Topography of a Method: François Louis Ganshof and the Writing of History, 
Tübingen, 2014.
18 Boureau, Kantorowicz, 108.
19 I use Joseph Mali’s notion that he discusses in his brilliant Mythistory; for an earlier and slightly diffe-
rent approach see William H. McNeill’s presidential address to the American Historical Association: 
Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians, in: The American Historical Review 91, No. 1 
(1986), 1–10.
20 Mali, Mythistory, xi.
21 Ibid., xii.
22 This is certainly not the place to try to give a full historical account of the events. For an extensive 
bibliography until 1990 see Larry D. Benson, The Loyalty Oath Controversy: A Bibliography, Monti-
cello, Ill. 1990. For a full historical approach see most recently Bob Blauner, Resisting McCarthyism. 
To Sign or Not to Sign California’s Loyalty Oath, Stanford, CA, 2009; David Gardner, The Califor-
nia Oath Controversy, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1967. See also: George R. Stewart, The Year of the Oath, 
144 ÖZG 25 | 2014 | 3
Garden City, N.Y. 1950; David Lance Goines, The Year of the Oath, in: The Free Speech Movement: 
Coming of Ages in the 1960s, Berkeley 1993; Nancy K. Innis, Lessons from the Controversy of the 
Loyalty Oath at the University of California, London 1992. Verne A. Stadtman, A Test of Loyalty, in: 
The University of California, 1868–1968: A Centennial Publication of the University of California, 
New York 1970. 
23 See for reference the numerous interviews of the Berkeley Oral History Project that often include 
passages about the year of the oath and its consequences.
24 Most recently the ultimate history of the California oath was written by a Berkeley graduate who later 
became professor of sociology at Cal Blauner, Resisting McCarthyism.
25 For the larger context of the California controversy see e.g. Lionel Stanley Lewis, Cold War on Cam-
pus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control, New Brunswick, N.J. 1988; Sigmund Dia-
mond, Compromised Campus: The Collaboration of Universities with the Intelligence Community, 
1945–1955 New York/Oxford 1992. Ellen Wolf Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the 
Universities, New York/Oxford 1986.
26 Neil Hamilton, Zealotry and Academic Freedom. A legal and historical Perspective, New Brunswick/
London 1995, 17.
27 See Blauner, McCarthyism.
28 Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, 1949.
29 Hamilton, Zealotry, 19.
30 See Cathryn Carson/David Hollinger, Eds., Reappraising Oppenheimer: Centennial Studies and 
Reflections, Berkeley 2005; Jeff Hughes, The Manhattan Project: Big Science and the Atom Bomb, 
Chicago, Ill. 2003.
31 Lionel S. Lewis, The Cold War and Academic Governance. The Lattimore Case at Johns Hopkins, 
Albany, N.Y. 1993, xi.
32 David Gardner, The California Oath Controversy, Berkeley/Los Angeles, CA 1967, 11.
33 Blauner, McCarthyism, 7.
34 Dennes, Philosophy and the University, Regional Oral History Office, 95.
35 John D. Hicks (non-signer, History) to Stephen D. Bechtel (Chairman, Alumni Council, California 
Alumni Association), August 3, 1950; here quoted from To Bring You the Facts, pamphlet privately 
printed and distributed by eighteen alumni of the Berkeley campus, August 17, 1950.
36 Constitution of the State of California, Article 20, Section 3.
37 Faculty Bulletin, Berkeley, May 1949.
38 George R. Stewart, The Year of the Oath. The Fight for Academic Freedom at the University of Cali-
fornia, New York 1950.
39 Letter from Kantorowicz to Robert G. Sproul, October 4, 1949, reprinted in: Kantorowicz, Funda-
mental Issue, 6.
40 Blauner, McCarthyism, 74–76.
41 Gordon Griffiths, Venturing Outside the Ivory Tower: The Political Autobiography of a College Pro-
fessor, 64; here quoted after Blauner, Mc Carthyism, 75; Griffiths had joined the communist party 
during the 1930s, and was fired as one of the non-signers of the oath. In the 1960s he again got invol-
ved in the opposition to the loyalty oath at the University of Washington. 
42 Here quoted after Blauner, McCarthyism, 75.
43 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The Fundamental Issue. Documents and Marginal Notes on the University of 
California Loyalty Oath, San Francisco 1950, 4.
44 Kantorowicz, Fundamental Issue, 4
45 Ibid.
46 For the history of this motive see Reinhart Koselleck, Historia Magistra Vitae. Über die Auflösung 
des Topos im Horizont neuzeitlich bewegter Geschichte, in: Id., Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik 
geschichtlicher Zeiten, Frankfurt am Main 1989, 38–66.
47 Marion Dönhoff, Ernst Kantorowicz, in: Robert Benson/Johannes Fried, Eds., Ernst Kantorowicz: 
Erträge der Doppeltagung Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton; Universität Frankfurt am Main, 
Stuttgart 1997, 11–13, 13; if not indicated otherwise all translations are by the author.
48 Originally “Mrs.” manually revised to “Mr.”
145ÖZG 25 | 2014 | 3
49 Leo Baeck Institute, Ernst Kantorowicz Collection; Pamphlet “The Fundamental Issue”, Documents 
and Marginal Notes on the U. of Cal., Loyalty Oath by Ernst Kantorowicz; AR 7216 1/17, letter to 
Raymond Sontag, March 2, 1950; original emphasis.
50 Kantorowicz, Fundamental Issue, 4.
51 For the historian’s attitude towards contingency see Arnd Hoffmann, Zufall und Kontingenz in der 
Geschichtstheorie. Mit zwei Studien zu Theorie und Praxis der Sozialgeschichte, Frankfurt am Main, 
2005.
52 Kantorowicz, Fundamental Issue, 4.
53 Ibid., 5.
54 For considerations about the call of the academic institution that makes the professor see the chapter 
on Heidegger in Avital Ronell, The Telephone Book. Technology – Schizophrenia – Electric Speech, 
Lincoln, NE 1989.
55 The lecture was first published in German as Wissenschaft als Beruf, Berlin/Munich 1919; the Eng-
lish translation, “Science as Vocation,” is based on the 1922 edition of the lecture as part of the 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tübingen 1922, 524–555.
56 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management, New York, NY/London 1911; 
see Frank Donoghue, The Last Professors: The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities, 
New York, NY 2008.
57 Max Weber, Science as Vocation, in: Id., Essays in Sociology, ed. by H.H. Gerth/C. Wright Mills, 
Oxford, UK 1946, 129–156, 134.
58 Ibid., 133.
59 Ibid.
60 Kantorowicz, Fundamental Issue, 7.
61 Ibid., 5.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Karl Löwith, Von Rom nach Sendai. Von Japan nach Amerika: Reisetagebuch 1936 und 1941, ed. by 
Klaus Stichweh/Ulrich von Bülow, Marbach 2005, cf. 105: “Autofahrt nach Berkeley – Eucalyptus-
bäume, schönster Blick über die Bay. Ich zu E. Kantorowicz, der sein Georgesches Reich inzwischen 
säkularisiert hat und ‘irgendwie’ sagt. Likörbatterien in einer grotesken Filmdiva-Wohnung. Huxleys 
Beschreibung.”
65 Grünwald, Kantorowicz und George, 84–85.
66 Hans Belting, Images in History and Images of History, in: Benson/Fried, Eds., Ernst Kantorowicz: 
Erträge, 94–103, 98.
67 See Leo Baeck Institute, Ernst Kantorowicz Collection, AR 7216, 2/7, folder “England–includes let-
ters ref. to emigration from Germany;” and Boureau, Kantorowicz. 
68 Weber in the German version uses “proletaroid”, Weber, Wissenschaft, 3.
69 See for instance the different statements of Regent Ehrman during the debates on the oath. 
70 Archives of the Leo Baeck Institute (LBI Archives), E. Kantorowicz Collection 1908–1982, box 7, fol-
der 2, letter Sproul to , Frederic L. Paxson, March 12, 1942.
71 Leo Baeck Institute, E. Kantorowicz Collection 1908–1982, box 7, folder 2, letter Sproul to Paxson, 
March 12, 1942.
72 Grover Sales, The Scholar and the Loyalty Oath, in: San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 8 1963.
73 Belting, Images, 98.
74 Gardner, Oath Controversy.
75 Bancroft Library, University of California Archives, Papers of the Group for Academic Freedom, 
Resolution adopted by the Group for Academic Freedom, July 6, 1950.
76 Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, Papers of the Group for Academic Freedom, 
Correspondence, Letter to Kantorowicz, not dated.
77 Minutes of the Academic Senate, Northern Section, Vol. 8, 125a, Meeting of Nov 7, 1949.
78 See Minutes of the Academic Senate, Minutes of Meetings of October 10, 1949; November 7, 1949; 
January 16, 1950; March 7, 1950; May 1, 1950; June 6, 1950; see also Gardner, California Oath.
79 Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions? Academic Freedom 
and the Future of the University, in: Academe 80, No. 6 (1994), 52–63, 52.
146 ÖZG 25 | 2014 | 3
80 His example is, once more, John Searle.
81 David Hollinger, Money and Academic Freedom Fifty Years after McCarthyism: Universities amid 
the Force Fields of Capital, in: Peggie G. Hollingsworth, ed., Unfettered Expression. Freedom in 
American Intellectual Life, Ann Arbor, Mich. 2000, 161–184, 164.
82 Jacques Derrida, The Future of the Profession or the University without Condition (Thanks to the 
“Humanities,” what Could Take Place tomorrow), in: Jacques Derrida and the Humanities. A Critical 
Reader, Cambridge, U.K. 2002, 24–57, 26.
83 William W. Van Alystyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the 
United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, in: Law and Contemporary Problems 53 (1990), 114.
84 For an history of the idea of academic freedom in the United States see Richard Hofstadter and Wal-
ter Metzger, The Developement of Academic Freedom in the United States, New York 1955.
85 For a full historical account of the US university system since the mid-19th century see Laurence R. 
Veysey, The Emergence of the American University, Chicago, Ill. 1965.
86 R.M. O’Neil, Academic Freedom: Past, Present, and Future beyond September 11, in: P.G. Altbach/
R.O. Berdahl, et al., Eds., American Higher Education in the Twenty-First Century: Social, Political, 
and Economic Challenges, Baltimore, Maryland 2005.
87 John Dewey, Academic Freedom, in: The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 2, Carbondale, Ill. 1976, 
55.
88 Richard Rorty, Education as Socialization and as Individualization, in: Richard Rorty, Philosophy 
and Social Hope, London 1999, 114–126, 123 (with reference to Dewey).
89 American Association of University Professors, Statement of Principles, 1915, 36.
90 AAUP, Principles, 1915, 27.
91 Joan W. Scott, Knowledge, Power, and Academic Freedom, in: Social Research 76, No. 2 (2009) 451–
480, 456 f.
92 AAUP, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretative 
Comments URL: http://www.aaup.org/file/principles-academic-freedom-tenure.pdf (last visited 
March 2, 2014).
93 AAUP, 1940 Statement.
94 Ibid.
95 Scott, Knowledge, 457.
96 AAUP, 1940 Statement.
97 See Jacques Le Goff, Intellectuals in the Middle Ages, Oxford, U.K. 1993.
98 For Kantorowicz’s sacralization of the past see Carl Landauer, Ernst Kantorowicz and the Sacraliza-
tion of the Past, in: Central European History 27 No. 1 (1994), 1–25.
99 Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, personnel file “Kantorowicz, Ernst H.” 
100 See Mali’s chapter on Kantorowicz in Mythistory; as well as his article Ernst H. Kantorowicz: History 
as Mythenschau, in: History of Political Thought 18 No. 4 (1997), 579–603. See initially Albert Brack-
mann, Kaiser Friedrich II. in ‘mythischer Schau’, in: Historische Zeitschrift 140 (1929), 534–549; 
Ernst Kantorowicz, ‘Mythenschau’ Eine Erwiderung, in: Historische Zeitschrift 141 (1930), 457–471; 
Albert Brackmann, Nachwort. Anmerkung zu Kantorowicz’ Erwiderung, in: Historische Zeitschrift 
141 (1930), 472–478.
101 Bernhard Jussen, The King’s Two Bodies Today, in: Representations 106 (2009), 102–117, 103.
102 For this aspect see Anthony Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History. Cambridge, MA, 1997.
103 Otto G. Oexle, German Malaise of Modernity: Ernst H. Kantorowicz and his ‘Kaiser Friedrich der 
Zweite,’ in: Benson/Fried, Eds., Ernst Kantorowicz: Erträge, 33–56, 37.
104 See Eckhart Grünewald, Ernst Kantorowicz und Stefan George. Beiträge zur Biographie des Histori-
kers bis zum Jahre 1938 und zu seinem Jugendwerk Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite, Wiesbaden 1982.
105 Kantorowicz, Das Geheime Deutschland, 2.
106 See Ulrich Raulff, Kreis Ohne Meister: Stefan Georges Nachleben, München 2009; Thomas Karlauf, 
Stefan George. Die Entdeckung des Charisma, München 2007; Robert E. Norton, Secret Germany: 
Stefan George and his Circle, Ithaca, NY 2002; in particular Grünewald, Ernst Kantorowicz und Ste-
fan George.
107 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Das Geheime Deutschland, here quoted from the typescript in the archives of 
the Leo Baeck Institute, http://www.archive.org/stream/ernstkantorowicz00reel02p. 6.
147ÖZG 25 | 2014 | 3
108 Kantorowicz, Das Geheime Deutschland, 4; emphasis added.
109 Ibid. 21.
110 Le Goff, Time, 136.
111 See Arthur R., Jr Evans, ed., On Four Modern Humanists: Hofmannsthal, Gundolf, Curtius, Kanto-
rowicz, Princeton, NJ 1970; Kay Schiller, Gelehrte Gegenwelten. Über humanistische Leitbilder im 
20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt am Main 2000. 
112 Mali, Mythistory, 204.
113 Kantorowicz, Fundamental Issue, 2.
114 Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, 494.
115 Kantorowicz to Kehr, June 6, 1933, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Rep 92 (HA I), 
Nachlaß Paul F. Kehr, AI 6 Lit., ka-ke, fasc. Prof Dr. Ernst Kantorowicz, Blatt 111; here quoted accor-
ding to the edition in Peter Th. Walther and Wolfgang Ernst, Ernst H. Kantorowicz. Eine archäo-bio-
graphische Skizze, in: Wolfgang Ernst/Cornelia Vismann, Eds., Geschichtskörper. Zur Aktualität von 
Ernst H. Kantorowicz, München 2002, 207–231, 216.
116 For the history of the law suit see Gardner, California Oath, and Blauner, McCarthyism.
117 Jacques Le Goff, Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages, Chicago/London 1980, 131. I should 
mention that Jacques Le Goff (as many other French intellectuals, including Michel Foucault) admi-
red the work of Kantorowicz, in particular The King’s Two Bodies.
118 Ibid., 127.
119 Ibid., 125. 
120 Ibid.
121 Kantorowicz, Fundamental Issue, 15.
122 Ibid., 16.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 17.
126 Randolph S. Starn, Kantorowicz in the Archives, Berkeley, CA 1991, unpublished Ms., 3.
127 Émile Durkheim, The Evolution of Educational Thought, London and Boston 1977 (French 1938).
128 Dönhoff, Kantorowicz.
129 Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, University Archives, CU-5.2, 91:76, personnel 
file “Tolman, Edward C.,” letter of Robert G. Sproul to Edward C. Tolman, August 12, 1954; empha-
sis added.
130 Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, University Archives, CU-5.2, 91:76, personnel 
file “Tolman, Edward C.,” letter of Robert G. Sproul to Edward C. Tolman, August 12, 1954.
131 Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, University Archives, CU-5.2, 91:76, personnel 
file “Tolman, Edward C.,” letter of Tolman to Sproul, November 1, 1954.
132 Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, University Archives, CU-5.2, 91:76, personnel 
file “Tolman, Edward C.,” letter of Edward C. Tolman to Robert G. Sproul, November 1, 1954.
133 Edward C. Tolman, Freedom and the Cognitive Mind, in: American Psychologist 9 (1954), 536–538, 
536.
134 Ibid., 537.
135 Ibid., 538.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Interview with the artist by Erica Mu, “99% invisible: Berkeley’s invisible monument to free speech,” 
June 2011, http://kalwnews.org/audio/2011/06/06/99-invisible-berkeley%E2%80%99s-invisible-
monument-free-speech_1024815.html.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Tolman, Freedom and the Cognitive Mind, 536.
142 Ibid, 536.
